The Torah requires two witnesses to convict someone of a capital crime. Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses a scenario: if two witnesses in a capital case observe two separate parts of a sinful act, can they join to be considered one set of witnesses? Rashi explains how this could be, such as if witnesses observed a forbidden sexual intercourse, where one saw the beginning and the other the end. Meaning, the sex act can happen over a period of time, so both witnesses saw the same act, but at different moments.
Shu”t Amudei Ohr (57:8) asks how it is possible to convict based on testimony about the sexual transgression at the second part, since we have a legal principle (Kesuvos 51a) that when the beginning is without consent or will, but the end happens due to being overcome by desire, the person is still held blameless as “the desire clothed her.” The Gemara in Kesuvos describes a hypothetical situation where a woman was unwillingly forced into a sexual act, but somewhere in the middle, she begins to enjoy it. She is still not held liable, as the desire overtook her against her will. (This is not to validate the rape because “she really wants it” or “no means yes.” Rather, it is simply a possible exemption that does not allow us to convict her beyond a shadow of doubt.) Therefore, Amudei Ohr asks, even in our scenario, where the person started willingly, the fact is that by the end, he may no longer have self-control, so it is not a willful act, and testimony about that part of the act should not be valid for conviction.
Amudei Ohr answers based on a responsa of Noda BeYehuda (EH 150), which makes a distinction between the psycho-physical realities of men and women. Since the Gemara only stated this principle regarding a woman, it might be something in her psychology or physiology that allows her to be swept up by desire, but a man might not be able to claim that as much. (We find something similar in the Talmud’s assertion (Yevamos 53b) that since a man must desire in order to have an erection, in most circumstances, he cannot claim there isn’t some will, even if somehow forced into a sexual act. This is not exactly true in all cases but also speaks to the idea that the less passive nature of the male sexual act creates more intent.)
However, Shu”t Maharit (1:21) rejects this idea and understands that a male can also theoretically become overcome by desire to the point of losing free will. Therefore, Amudei Ohr offers another answer: In the case of Gemara Kesuvos, the initial act was against the person’s will, so if later she becomes overcome by desire, we do not consider this intent. But in our Gemara’s case, the person started in a willful manner. Even if later he becomes overcome by desire, we do not accept that as an excuse as his origins intent affirms the entire entire act.
This discussion relates to the broader issue: Can a person be presented with a religious test that he cannot resist? People often repeat the line, “Hashem does not give you a nisayon (challenge) that you cannot overcome.” While this might inspire some to work harder to overcome it, what about those who fail? Shall they now feel like a double failure—that they failed in whatever challenge, and on top of that, it really was something that could have been overcome, and God even promises that? If this is a theologically incorrect and misinformed statement, which I believe it is as I shall demonstrate, what can be more cruel than to perpetuate such a belief?
There are psychiatric conditions that compel people to behave in particular ways, and if they do not, they experience unbearable and unrelenting anxiety. For example, there is a condition called trichotillomania, whereby those suffering from this illness feel an intense urge to pull at their hair or pick their skin. Since this is forbidden on Shabbos (according to halacha, these prohibitions exist to varying degrees and may even be medoraysa, which is beyond the scope of this discussion), if people suffering from trichotillomania pick their skin or hair on Shabbos, are they halachically liable?
Furthermore, what about various forms of addictions and compulsions, such as alcoholism, drug addiction, gambling addiction, food addiction, sexual addiction, and even internet addiction? To the degree that these addictions compel people to behave immorally, are they halachically considered to be in a state of “oness” (beyond their control)? For those who have no experience with addictions, it may be hard to believe, but the power of addictions must not be underestimated. Do not judge others until you have been in their shoes. Many people refer to addiction as a “cunning, baffling, and powerful disease,” which is an apt description.
And what about illnesses such as depression? People who are depressed find it difficult to do anything and lose the will to perform even the simplest activities. Is someone who is depressed obligated in davening or other mitzvos?
Moed Kattan (17a, as well as Kiddushin 40a and Chagigah 16a) discusses a person who feels an overwhelming desire to sin and cannot seem to control himself. The text states the following:
Rav Ilai states, “If one sees in himself that his inclination to sin is overwhelming him, he should go to a place where no one recognizes him, wear black, wrap his head in black, and do what his heart desires and not publicly desecrate the Name of Heaven.”
The simple reading of the Gemara seems to be that, assuming a person is in a state where he feels he can no longer control himself, it is better to sin in a manner that hides his identity so that it does not make a chillul Hashem. The behavior of a random, oddly dressed individual will not encourage others to sin, nor bring shame on any particular community or group. However, this reading also implies that it is indeed possible for a person to be in a state where he can no longer control himself.
Indeed, many commentaries cannot accept the implications of a simple reading of Rav Ilai’s prescription to “wear black etc. and do as his heart desires,” and therefore understand it differently. For example, Tosafos (op. cit.) quotes Rabbenu Chananel as follows:
“Chas v’shalom that the Gemara is permitting one to sin.” Rather, the Gemara is suggesting a tactic to break down the person’s pride: by wearing humble clothes and going to a foreign place, he will lose his desire. When the Gemara states, “do what his heart desires,” it means what his heart truly desires—that is, to follow the Torah.
This clever interpretation of the Gemara certainly makes sense psychologically. It employs a tactic of delaying the sin (by having to travel to another place) and distracting the person. Furthermore, by making him wear different clothes and travel to a foreign place (perhaps experiencing danger or at least poverty and frustration), he will have a better chance to re-evaluate his priorities.
Having said that, Tosafos (Chagigah 16a, “V’Ya’aseh”) rejects this reinterpretation and favors the simple reading of the text, as the context of the Gemara in Moed Kattan indicates that Rabbi Ilai’s prescription was actually used by a sage, and sins were committed. The “intervention” was useful in that it allowed for some kind of forgiveness in the afterlife, as it secured his admittance to the burial spots reserved for judges (or those judged and forgiven, see Ritva), though not for pious ones, as the Gemara explained. Therefore, there is clear support for the idea that indeed one can experience challenges and nisyonos that are beyond a person’s ability to manage.
Tosafos in Eiruvin (41b, “Miy”) implies that though a person can reach a point where they have urges they can no longer control, they are responsible for catching their state of mind at an earlier point before they lose control. A good way to understand emotions is like a horse whinnying in the barn. At first, when the horse is only slightly agitated, you can stroke its hair, give it a sugar cube, and soothe it. However, if the horse gets too anxious and breaks the barn door down, it’s very hard to stop it once it’s at full gallop.
There is also an entire section of the Torah that deals with *Eishes Yefas Toar*, which the Gemara (Kiddushin 21b) sees as a necessary concession to the unmanageable urges and lusts that ensue during times of war, especially during the bloodlust of battle. Tzidkas Hatzadik (100) has a radical theology that all sins are de facto divinely ordained, as all that happens is God’s will. Repentance merely involves regretting that the sin was done out of personal desire instead of a wish to serve Hashem. In fact, on this basis, he offers an explanation of how Chazal can say that true teshuva is able to turn sins into mitzvos. Since the deed itself was God’s will, once the person repents for the lust and accepts to only do God’s will, the picture is complete—doing God’s will with the correct intention. Of course, none of this is to say one can assume that, when faced with a desire to sin, he ought not fight it. A sin is still a sin and must be viewed as such. However, after the fact, it may indeed have been a desire or compulsion that could not have been controlled. Similarly, Mei HaShiloach (Volume I, Bamidbar, Pinchas) discusses nine different levels of Yetzer Hara, whereby the final level is insurmountable and must be the will of God.
The Chofetz Chaim, in his sefer “Shmiras Halashon”, discusses the possibility that when a person is being verbally or physically assaulted, it may be permitted to respond in a likewise fashion (see “Lavin” section, Be’er Mayim Chayim 8:9). Although it is praiseworthy to resist the temptation to react and instead remain calm, the Torah may consider it acceptable and human to respond in kind, even if it is violent.
Of course, how people behave when they lose control may be hurtful and destructive, and I am not endorsing physical or verbal violence. The question under discussion is not whether this behavior is good or proper, but whether it is possible that a person can be provoked beyond his or her control.
Despite the ample proofs I have provided for a strong trend in Jewish thought that indeed there are situations where a nisayon is too great to resist, Bereishis Rabbah (55:2) appears to contradict this:
Hashem tries the righteous; and His soul hates the evil ones and those who love violence (Tehillim 11:5). Rabbi Yonasan said: When a flax worker knows that his flax is of good quality, the more he beats it, the more it improves and the more it glistens; but if it is of inferior quality, he cannot give it one knock without it splitting. Similarly, Hashem does not test the wicked—why? Because they cannot withstand it, as it is written, "And the evil ones He expels like the sea" (Yeshaya 57:20). And who does God test? The righteous, as it says, "Hashem tries the righteous." "And it was, after these things, his master’s wife cast [tisah] her eyes upon Yosef and said, ‘Lie with me’" (Bereishis 39:7). "And it was, after these things"—Rabbi Yonasan said: A potter does not test defective vessels, because he cannot give them a single blow without breaking them. What then does he test? Only strong vessels, for he will not break them even with many blows. Similarly, the Holy One of Blessing does not test the wicked but the righteous, as it says, "Hashem tries the righteous." Rabbi Eleazar said: When a man possesses two cows, one strong and the other weak, on which one does he put the yoke? Surely on the strong one. Similarly, God tests only the righteous, as it says, "Hashem tries the righteous."
This does seem to say that God only gives tests that a person can withstand, and this might be the support for Rabbenu Chananel’s position. However, it is not really a contradiction. The situation in Bereishis Rabbah discusses a test specifically sent by God, such as the tests sent to Avraham or Iyov. We may agree that since God is wise and just, He will not send a test to someone unable to withstand it. On the other hand, there could be so-called ordinary challenges in life having to do with natural desires and natural capacities. In those situations, there still might exist a poor combination of natural ability and strength versus instinctive drives. Just as a person might be too weak and unable to stay physically healthy, a person can suffer weaknesses of the soul and character that interfere with spiritual and moral health. Just as in regard to physical strength a person might be able to overcome it with extra effort but also may be past his limit, so it is possible with moral matters that it may be beyond his character strength and emotional strength. A depressed person may not be able to overcome his depression and put on tefillin. An alcoholic might not be able to overcome his cravings for alcohol, and so too a sex addict might not be able to overcome his desires.
In the end, we all must answer to Hashem. He knows if we are sincerely struggling to overcome compulsive or addictive behaviors, and only He can forgive. A person struggling with compulsions and addictions can draw comfort from the above Gemara to recognize that at times a person may succumb—yet not despair, give up hope, or use it as an excuse for moral laxity. It is helpful to keep in mind Step Two of the Twelve Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous: “We came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.” This sentiment is echoed by the Gemara Kiddushin (30b): “The desire to commit sin overpowers a person on a daily basis, and if not for Divine assistance, it would be insurmountable.” Just as a person who is physically unwell may be temporarily exempt from mitzvos but is responsible to seek out healing, so too a person in the throes of addiction must seek help and guidance.
Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation 
If you liked this, you might enjoy my Relationship Communications Guide. Click on the link above.
Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, LCSW-R, DHL is a psychotherapist who works with high conflict couples and families. He can be reached via email at simchafeuerman@gmail.com